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INTRODUCTION

In Whitman v. American Trucking Ass 'ns,' the Supreme Court returned
to a question to which it has provided the same answer for over fifty years:
how aggressively should courts review the procedure an agency employs to
implement a broad statutory mandate? In American Trucking, this question
arose in the context of the non-delegation doctrine, more particularly, the
version of that doctrine developed by the D.C. Circuit. According to the
court, broadly written regulatory statutes could be struck down as overbroad delegations unless the agency cured the problem by supplying principles or guidelines limiting its own discretion. The Supreme Court rejected this idea, favoring instead the standard version of the non-delegation
doctrine, in which the limiting principle had to emanate from Congress.2
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
Email: william.araiza@lls.edu.
1. 531 U.S. 457 (2001),
2. Justice Thomas was the only member of the Court in American Trucking to question the standard formula that Congress satisfied the non-delegation requirement by sup-
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The Supreme Court's rejection of an agency cure for a non-delegation
flaw could be viewed as the triumph of a rigid traditional doctrine over a
more nuanced approach to the relationship between Congress and administrative agencies, or as a common-sense rejection of an ultimately incoherent theory. From another perspective, though, the Court's analysis can be
viewed as consistent with its past rejections of judicial attempts to control
an agency's decision as to the best method of implementing a regulatory
statute. The Court's broadest insistence on agency procedural discretion is
found in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,3 though analogous statements can be found in several
more discrete doctrinal areas.4
At the same time, parties dissatisfied with agency action may seek ex
post review of the substantive rationality of the agency's decision. By
contrast to demands for judicially-imposed procedure, to which it has generally been inhospitable, the Supreme Court has at times been willing to
engage in serious judicial policing of agency choices under the auspices of
such substantive review.
This Article considers the potential for judicial and legislative checks on
a troubling aspect of the administrative process: the practice of ex parte Office of Management and Budget (OMB) participation in rulemaking. It begins by noting the past, and the hints of current, administration attitudes
toward such ex parte contauts, and suggests those approaches leave open
the possibility of inappropriate OMB contacts, thus necessitating a judicial
or legislative check. Moving first to the courts, the Article briefly notes
examples where the Supreme Court has rejected attempts to impose freestanding judicial conceptions of appropriate administrative procedure, and
predicts that such reluctance would probably extend to demands for restrictions on ex parte OMB participation in the rulemaking process. It next
examines substantive judicial review of regulatory results, and suggests
that such review may not adequately police against inappropriate OMB
conduct. Moving back to process-but this time, procedural requirements
based on the APA-the Article speculates on the existence and appropriate
scope of such APA-based procedural limits on OMB conduct. The Article
then examines the possibility of legislative action to check OMB. It concludes where its analysis begins-the White House-suggesting that, ultimately, presidential administrations are the main hope for ensuring that
plying an "intelligible principle" in the statute. See id. at 486-87. Justice Thomas, however,
just like the other members of the Court (indeed, to a greater degree, given his insistence on
more precision in the statute), refused to allow the agency to cure what would otherwise be
a statute's failure to satisfy the non-delegation requirement. See id.
3. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
4. See infra Part 1I.B and text accompanying notes 65-67 (demonstrating the Court's
insistence on agency procedural discretion).
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OMB oversight does not unduly impair the basic procedural fairness of the
rulemaking process.

1. OMB REVIEW AND Ex PARTE CONTACTS
The history of OMB review has been told often5 and will not be repeated
here. For the purposes of this Article, the important point is that the commencement of regularized White House review of the regulatory process
quickly engendered concern about the executive acting as a confidential
partner of and conduit for regulated parties seeking to influence agency action.6 Such ex parte contacts and uses of OMB as an information conduit
generated criticism as impairing the procedural regularity and fairness of
the notice-and-comment process, the quality of the substantive regulations
the process produced, and the precision of judicial review of the final
regulation.7 In response to these concerns, and sometimes in response to
legislative pressure,8 the White House itself imposed controls that sought to
correct this problem.
These White House controls took initial shape during the second Reagan
administration, when the OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) drafted procedures governing such ex parte contacts to head
off legislatively-imposed limits on OMB review. 9 The elder President
Bush's OMB continued to accept those procedures,' 0 which were largely
adopted by President Clinton." These procedures impose several relevant
limits on OMB's activities. First, they limit the OMB personnel with

5. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245,
2247-48 (2001) (providing background on establishment and development of OMB).
6. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 n.520 (DC. Cir. 1981) (noting an executive branch memorandum dealing with this issue dating from 1979).
7. See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Ex ParteContacts and InstitutionalRoles: Lessons
from the 0MB Experience, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 591, 624 (1988) (criticizing ex parte contacts
and uses of OMB as an information conduit).
8. See infra text accompanying note 74 (noting the executive branch has attempted to

maintain procedural integrity of administrative rulemaking by disclosing communication
between White House and other agencies).

9. See Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 405 n.520 (noting an earlier memorandum, drafted
during the Carter administration, also considered this issue, in the context of regulatory review performed by the Council of Economic Advisors).
10. See Memorandum from Wendy L. Gramm, Administrator, OIRA, to the Heads of
Departments and Agencies Subject to Executive Order Nos. 12,291 and 12,498 (June 13,
1986), reprintedin OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REGULATORY PRoGRAM oF T7m

U.S. GovER.MNT, 683 App. I, Apr. 1, 1991-Mar. 31, 1992 [hereinafter Wendy Gramm
Memo].
11. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.RI 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2000) (establishing new programs to reform the regulatory process).
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whom private parties may meet or communicate regarding a rule, 2 and require that the agency be invited to attend such meetings. 1 3 Second, they require the existence and subject matter of such meetings and communications be disclosed to the public.' 4 Finally, they require disclosure to the
public of the documents exchanged between OMB and the agency, but only
after the agency action' 5 is completed.
One difference between the Reagan and Clinton orders deals with disclosure of information sent by private parties to OMB. The Clinton order
requires OIRA simply to forward to the agency all written communications
between OIRA personnel and the private parties.1 6 By contrast, under the
Reagan-era regime OMB merely "advised" private parties wishing to submit information to send it both to OMB and the agency, "so that the material may be made a part of the agency record.' 17 Thus, under the Reagan
procedures OMB did not necessarily forward that information,18 although

the information was publicly available at OIRA itself. 19
12. See Wendy Gramm Memo, supra note 10, at 684; Exec. Order No. 12,866,
§ 6(bX4XA), 3 C.F.R. 638, 647 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000) (designating the
administrator of OIRA, or a particular designee, as the sole person who can receive information submitted to agencies from persons who are not employed by the federal govern-

ment).
13. See Wendy Gramm Memo, supra note 10, at 684; Exec. Order No. 12,866,

§ 6(bX4XB)(i), 3 C.F.R. 647 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000) (requiring OIRA to
invite a representative from an issuing agency to any meeting held to discuss a regulatory
action under review).
14. See Wendy Gramm Memo, supra note 10, at 684; Exec. Order No. 12,866
§ 6(bX4)(CXii)-(iii), 3 C.F.R. 647 (1994), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000) (mandating
OIRA place in its reading room all written materials submitted by persons outside the federal government and a record of all communications taken during meetings concerning the
rulemaking process). Under the Reagan and Bush administrations, this disclosure only applied with regard to rulemakings conducted by agencies that elected to participate in this
particular safeguard.
15. See Wendy Gramm Memo, supra note 10, at 684; Exec. Order No. 12,866,
§ 6(bX4)(D), 3 C.F.R. 647, 648 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000) (obligating
OIRA to disclose all documents exchanged between OIRA and the agency even if OIRA
decides not to publish the results of the regulatory action in the Federal Register). The
agency action may be a preliminary one, such as an advance notice of proposed rulemaking.
16. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(bX4)(B)(ii), 3 C.F.R. 647 (1994), reprintedin 5
U.S.C. § 601 (2000) (ordering OIRA to forward written communications between OIRA
personal and persons not employed by the federal government to the agency within ten
working days of its receipt).
17. Wendy Gramm Memo, supra note 10, at 683.
18. See id. (noting the important exception to this procedure concerning rules promulgated by Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), namely that the Reagan OMB agreed to
forward EPA copies of all relevant written material OMB received).
19. See id. (explaining a policy in which all written documents and a record of oral
communications between OIRA and a private party are maintained in OIRA's public read-
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The new administration has sent an interesting signal on this issue. A
September 20, 2001 memo from the OIRA Administrator, advising of the
administration's practice in implementing Executive Order 12,866, stated
that "until a modified or new Executive order is issued," written materials
received from outside the Executive branch "are ...forwarded to the rulemaking agency," but that "[i]t is the responsibility of each agency to place
[those materials] in the rulemaking docket." 20 Thus, this statement implicitly suggests the administration would not argue that the forwarding of such
private party submissions constitutes constitutionally privileged intrabranch communication. On the other hand, the memo's statement that it is
the agency's responsibility to docket the information hints that the Bush
administration would not necessarily be displeased if such information was
not docketed and made subject to reply by other parties 2' or used in an argument against the substantive rationality of the agency's decision. Obviously, neither the memo nor Executive Order 12,866 itself requires the
agency to docket the information, nor to treat such submissions, when appropriate, as public comments.
Thus, current presidential limits on OMB leave open the possibility it
will continue to act as a conduit, funneling information that does not end up
on the public rulemaking record. Moreover, these limits on OMB do not
mention other communications between the White House and agencies,
most notably oral communications concerning the consistency of the
agency's proposed action with the president's overall regulatory policy.
Thus, external checks could remain useful to guard against potentially inappropriate OMB influence over the rulemaking process. This Article first
considers judicial checks.
II. JUDICIAL CHECKS ON OMB INFLUENCE

A. ProceduralLimits on Agency Action Generally
The Supreme Court has consistently cautioned against imposing on
agencies procedural hurdles beyond those clearly mandated by Congress.
Its broadest statement of this caution is in Vermont Yankee, where it rejected a lower court's conclusion that it had the authority to impose proceing room).
20. Memorandum from John D. Graham, Administrator, OIRA, to the President's
Management Council (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/

inforeg/oirareview-process.html.
21. Cf FCC Practice and Procedure, 47 C.F.R. § 1.415(c) (2000) (Federal Communications Commission (FCC) rulemaking procedures allowing time for the public to reply to
comments submitted in response to a proposed rule).
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dures beyond those mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
if it decided the additional procedures were justified by importance of the
issue and the benefits those extra procedures might provide. Beyond Vermont Yankee, the Court has endorsed agency procedural discretion in several more discrete contexts. In the following two examples, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected limits on that discretion, even when they were
designed to achieve rule-of-law goals such as reasoned decision making
open to public participation.
1. RequiringAgencies to Act Through Rulemaking
Federal and State agencies are sometimes constrained in their discretion
to impose rules of conduct on private parties by means of case-by-case adjudications. 22 It is common wisdom that rulemaking enjoys several advantages over adjudications. First, regulations are generally applicable, while
adjudicatory results formally apply only to the defendants and thus, raise
the possibility of unfair singling-out. Similarly, regulations are usually enacted after a process open to all interested parties, while participation in
adjudications is typically limited to the parties directly involved, even
though the adjudicatory result may serve as precedent effectively binding
non-parties. Finally, regulations are normally prospective, and thus, give
regulated parties notice of the law, while adjudications are normally retrospective, and thus, run the risk of imposing new rules of conduct retroactively. While these disadvantages to adjudication can be mitigated, the
general consensus holds that rulemaking is normally a superior way for
agencies to establish regulatory policy.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has made it clear that federal agencies
are normally not required to proceed by rulemaking unless Congress explicitly so directs. In its foundational statement on this question, the Court
acknowledged that agencies may have good reasons for employing adjudications, and granted them broad discretion to make that determination.2
Under current doctrine, the only significant limits on that discretion arise,
first, when adjudication, retroactively applied," so changes the law as to
22. See Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism:State Administrative Procedureand InstitutionalDesign, 53 ADMIN Lr REv. 551, 572 n.93 (2001) (noting Florida and Oregon, especially, limit agencies in this regard).
23. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,202-03 (1947).
24. Administrative adjudications do not have to be retrospective. Administrative adjudicative prospectivity, while problematic in that it calls into quetion the character of the act
as adjudicative, may ultimately be no more problematic than judicial adjudicative prospectivity. See generally James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991) (discussing judicial prospectivity). For discussions of administrative adjudicative prospectivity,
see William D. Araiza, Agency Adjudication, the Importance ofFacts, and the Limitations
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constitute unfair retroactivity in violation of due process, 25 and, second
(and more speculatively), when an agency initially chooses to proceed by
rulemaking, and then changes, without justification, to a reliance on caseby-case adjudications in an attempt to avoid the strictures of the rulemaking
process it had originally chosen itself.26 In both of these situations the
agency action can fairly be described as arbitrary, either because it imposes
a severe retroactive burden without fair notice, or because its switch from
rulemaking to adjudication is unexplained.
2. Non-Delegation
The non-delegation approach developed by the D.C. Circuit-that agencies could cure an otherwise overbroad delegation by adopting regulations
constraining their own discretion-obviously has little to say about the
concern underlying the traditional non-delegation doctrine, namely, ensuring that Congress have the final word with regard to the basic value choices
underlying government policy. Instead, courts adopting the new nondelegation doctrine attempted to broaden the doctrine's scope by having it
respond to larger concerns about administrative accountability, concerns
that echo those underlying the general preference for rulemaking over adjudication. For example, according to the appellate court in American
Trucking, this new version of the doctrine reduced the risk of arbitrary
agency action, and helped assure a government responsive to popular
will. 27 These concerns find echoes in the rulemaking-versus-adjudication
debate's preference for generally applicable rules developed after a process
in which all interested parties are allowed to participate.
Still, the D.C. Circuit's embrace of the new non-delegation doctrine,
while applauded by some commentators,28 is open to critique.29 Most inportantly for our purposes, the court's concern for limiting principles ultiofLabels, 57 WASH. & LEE L. Rsv. 351, 391-96 (2000).
25. See Chenery, 332 U.S. at 203; see also Araiza, supra note 24, at 374-76, 387-91
(discussing due process implications of administrative adjudicative retroactivity).
26. See generallyFord Motor Corp. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981). This latter
doctrine is described as speculative because it has only been adopted by the Ninth Circuit,

and has been heavily criticized. For a more thorough discussion of Ninth Circuit caselaw on
this issue, see Araiza, supra note 24, at 365-70. For an example of criticism, see I KENNET
CULP DAvis & RicHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADM sTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 275 (3d ed. 1994).
27. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (explain-

ing one function of the non-delegation doctrine is to reflect the nation's popular will through

social policies created by Congress).
28. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schecter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrineforthe Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399 (2000).
29. See generally Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False Promise of the "New"
NondelegationDoctrine, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2000).
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mately reduces to a concern about the agency explaining its rationale for
choosing a certain regulatory result. Logically, this concern is vindicated
through review under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, in particular,
the requirement that the agency explain its decision. The D.C. Circuit's
version of the non-delegation doctrine may well be grounded in concepts of
control and accountability, but those concepts fit much more easily within
the concept of ex post review of the rationality of the agency's action. 0
If there is anything more to the D.C. Circuit's analysis-i.e., if the court
did in fact intend for the agency to do more than simply explain its choice
better-it must be the "something extra" is more process. Perhaps, for example, the court envisioned agencies bifurcating their rulemaking processes, at step one announcing the principles they would keep in mind when
applying the data it had, and at step two applying those principles to that
data.3 1 If this is what the court had in mind, its analysis-regardless of any
possible beneficial effects such bifurcation might bring 3 2-represents an
even more blatant attempt to dictate to the agency the process it should employ in reaching its decision. Under this reading, the court's opinion conflicts sharply with the Supreme Court's admonition that agencies should
enjoy broad discretion when determining how to proceed, subject only to
the procedural requirements in the APA itself.
B. Free-StandingProceduralReview and OMB Influence
The Court's rejection of free-standing procedural requirements in these
contexts makes it unlikely that such requirements could be imposed on
OMB interaction with an agency engaged in a rulemaking. As discussed
later in this Article, OMB supervision has at least some constitutional
grounding. Regardless of whether that constitutional argument is ultimately meritorious, the existence of these constitutional concerns would
only heighten the Court's general reluctance to intrude into agency processes, at least without a statutory mandate or a colorable constitutional
counter-argument, such as due process.
Accordingly, this Article turns to the APA's substantive rationality requirement as a tool for courts seeking to limit inappropriate OMB interference in rulemaking. Such substantive review answers the concerns raised
in American Trucking, and goes at least some of the way toward ensuring
30.

For a similar conclusion, see id. at 9; see also Craig N. Oren, Run Over by Ameri-

can Trucking PartI: Can EPA Revise Its Air Quality Standards, 29 Envtl. L. Inst. 10,653,
10,657-58 (1999) (arguing the D.C. Circuit's decision was in reality a decision that the
EPA's rule was arbitrary and capricious).
31. See Seidenfeld & Rossi, supra note 29, at 11-13 (suggesting the D.C. Circuit's version of the nondelegation doctrine entails essentially a two step process).
32. See id. (questioning whether such benefits would accrue).
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reasonable exercise of agencies' discretion to choose between rulemaking
and adjudication. The question to which this Article now turns is whether
substantive review also offers hope as a check on inappropriate OMB activity.
C. Substantive RationalityReview as a Check on OMB
Involvement in Rulemaking
Under the APA, courts review the substantive reasonableness of an
agency decision under either the "arbitrary and capricious" or "substantial
evidence" standards. While courts have used different language to describe
the scrutiny called for under these two standards, the general consensus today is that the two standards require an approximately equivalent degree of
judicial inquiry. The two standards may be different, however, with regard
to the allowable sources of supporting evidence. While serving on the D.C.
Circuit, Justice Scalia suggested that in substantial evidence review, support for the agency's action must be found in the public record created by
the agency, while arbitrary and capricious review allows the agency to support its decision with information never disclosed to the public in the notice-and-comment process.33
Thus, under the arbitrary and capricious standard the agency could defend its decision before a court by explicitly pointing to non-public information, such as information provided confidentially by OMB. By contrast,
such information cannot be used to support a decision reviewed under the
substantial evidence test. However, this restriction does not mean that conduit information or OMB's policy-based arguments can play no role in the
agency's decision making when the substantial evidence standard applies.
Judicial review of administrative rulemaking requires only that the decision
be supportable by the record. Courts do not insist on knowing the government's actual motivations. Thus, a requirement that a decision be adequately supported by record evidence still allows non-public information
(factual or policy-based) to play a decisive role in the agency's actual decicontained
sion to adopt a particular alternative, as long as the public record
34
decision.
its
of
explanation
agency's
the
adequate support for

33. See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Congress could also enact a hybrid statute, in
which it leaves in place the arbitrary and capricious standard as the applicable standard for

judicial review of the regulation's substance, but requires the court not to consider certain
information (e.g., information provided by OMB). See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d
298,405 n.519 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (describing such a provision in the Clean Air Act).

34. See Paul R. Verkuil, JawboningAdministrativeAgencies: Ex ParteContacts by the
White House, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 943, 981 n.204 (1980).

620
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This conclusion places judicial review of administrative rulemakingwhether formal or informal-squarely between the two extremes of constitutional review: the "rational basis" standard, under which courts are free to
hypothesize justifications for government action, and strict scrutiny, under
which courts insist on knowing the government's actual motivations. The
question is whether this middle position adequately addresses concerns
about the legitimacy of agency action. If ex post review serves simply to
ensure that agency decisions are based on reason, in the sense that the
agency's explanation for the result is supported by data relevant to the factors Congress intended for the agency to consider, then it might suffice for
courts to require only that there be adequate evidence, whether or not publicly disclosed, supporting its rationale.
However, courts rejected this limited conception of administrative rationality during the rulemaking revolution of the 1970's. That revolution
firmly linked the public's right to participate in rulemaking with substantive ex post review, on the theory that a lack of public participation deprived the agency of the benefit of the public's knowledge, thus making it
likely the agency's final choice was not fully informed and hence arbirry.35 In turn, the right to participate implied the right to access the information before the agency. As a common-sense matter, this linkage between disclosure of information and substantive rationality seems
appropriate: certainly, a "reasonable" decision can be defined as one taken
only after careful consideration of all the logical alternatives,36 which in
turn requires that private parties have the information the agency thinks
relevant to its consideration of those alternatives, to critique and improve
the agency's thought process. As a matter of administrative law, however,
this linkage has caused some confusion as to the source of the disclosure
requirement. As noted above, some courts have viewed the disclosure requirement as inextricably linked to the requirement that agency action not
be substantively arbitrary.3 7 Other judges, including Justice Scalia when
serving on the D.C. Circuit, have viewed the disclosure requirement as
emanating from the APA's procedural requirements themselves, even if
those requirements
are informed by the "arbitrary and capricious" review
38
standard.

35. See, e.g., Nat'l Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 791 F.2d 1016, 1023-24 (2d Cir.
1986) (holding the agency's action to be arbitrary and capricious on this ground).

36. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 48-51 (1982) (holding the agency's action was arbitrary and capricious because it failed

to consider logical alternatives to its action).
37. See Nat'l Black Media Coalition, 791 F.2d at 1023-24.
38. See Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 684. Then-judge Scalia suggested the require-

ment emanated from the APA since it only applied to informal rulemakings-for which
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Ultimately, it should not matter where one locates the source of the disclosure requirement. The point is that any judicial check on OMB involvement in rulemaking would ultimately have to be based on the
agency's failure to provide an adequate process. However, in contrast to
the previously-discussed procedural controls courts have attempted to impose, these procedural controls are found in the APA, whether explicitly in
the section 553 notice-and-comment procedures, or as a gloss on the APA's
substantive review standards. The next Part of this Article discusses those

procedural requirements.
D. APA-Based ProceduralRestrictions on OMB Involvement
in Rulemaking
Cases considering alleged agency failures to disclose information indicate that, while the right to comment includes the right to hear from the
agency the information it thinks most relevant to the issue, the agency need
not disclose every bit of information it had. A recent decision summarizing
the law stated that the APA is violated by "nondisclosure of the central
'subjects or issues involved' in the rule making by withholding the data
prompting the decisional change." 39 Such nondisclosure would include a
failure to disclose any of the technical information underlying a regulation, 4° or data, or methodologies for obtaining data, which the agency itself
cited as dispositive in its defense of the regulation.4' By contrast, nondisclosure of a study that simply corrected alleged methodological flaws in
there is a notice requirement in the APA-but not to informal adjudications, for which the
APA did not prescribe procedures but which are subject to the same arbitrary and capricious

review as rulenmakings.
39. Mortgage Inv.Corp. of Ohio v. Gober, 220 F,3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
40. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir.
1977) ("'It is not consonant with the purpose of a rulemaking proceeding to promulgate
rules on the basis of inadequate data, or on data that [in] critical degree, is known only to the
agency.').
41. See United States Lines v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(finding agency's failure to disclose a written agreement and other information violative of
the APA where it was "clear that the decisions made in reliance on these data were critical"
to its decision, because failure to provide data precluded "searching and careful" judicial
review); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
superseded by statute on other grounds by Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding agencies' failure to include testing information violative of the
APA where agency relied on such testing when it created new industry standards to enable
industry participants to comply with the Clean Air Act where other evidence showed the
testing and methodologies used were inconsistent and flawed); see also Nat ' Black Media
Coalition, 791 F.2d at 1023-24 (finding failure to disclose methodologies used to create
data, and interpretations of that data, which appeared to provide at least a significant part of
basis for agency's decision, does not violate APA).
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earlier agency studies, 42 or information about a facet of the issue that did
not define the agency's approach,43 have been found not to violate the
APA. On balance, these cases suggest that significant information can remain undisclosed as long as it is not critical to the decision. 44Thus, they also

suggest that much conduit information could be kept secret.

Applying these principles to OMB involvement in rulemaking might
benefit from distinguishing between the types of communications emanating from OMB. Reflecting the close link between process and substantive

rationality, the cases construing section 553 suggest that procedural requirements are motivated, at least in part, by a concern for the accuracy of
the agency's decision. 45 If public participation increases accuracy, it must
logically be due to the value of the public's information. If so, then ex
parte OMB communications concerning policy arguments should probably

be less restricted than OMB communications funneling empirical data to
the agency. 46 This distinction responds to the common-sense idea that pri42. See Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 749 F.2d 50, 57-58 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (distinguishing facts in present case from facts of PortlandCement in finding agency not in violation of the APA by noting that studies relied upon in present matter did not provide new information but instead only "expanded on and confirnmed" information already known to the
Commissioner of the FDA). "Rulemaking proceedings would never end if an agency's response to comments must always be made the subject of additional comments. The response may, moreover, take the form of new scientific studies without entailing the procedural consequence appellants would impose, unless prejudice is shown." Id. at 58.
43. See MortgageInvestors, 220 F.3d at 1379-80 (holding failure to disclose peripheral
data regarding trends in foreclosure rates did not violate APA because the APA "does not
...expressly require that interested parties receive notice of, and an opportunity to comment on, antecedent factual underpinnings for agency rule making.").
44. It should be noted that some of these opinions have noted the concern with the
practicalities of rulemaking; most importantly, that requiring too much disclosure would
lead to an endless circle of comment, generating new agency data which would then have to
be let out for yet more comment. See, e.g., Cmty. Nutrition, 749 F.2d at 58.
Rulemaking proceedings would never end if an agency's response to comments must
always be made the subject of additional comments.... It is impossible to perceive
why correction of an asserted deficiency in earlier studies-which correction confims the accuracy of those studies--should give rise to an additional opportunity to
comment.
Id.; see also Nova Scotia Foods, 568 F.2d at 251 n.15 (recognizing a concern an agency's
disclosure would trigger a never-ending discussion between the agency and the commentors); cf Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Richardson, 233 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding
an agency need not solicit a new round of comments if the final rule was the logical outgrowth of the version that had been open to comment). This problem would not arise in the
case of OMB ex parte contacts: as long as the conduit information was disclosed, section
553 would be satisfied.
45. For a discussion of this point, and an argument suggesting that accuracy is the important factor in disclosure issues, see supranote 26, 1 DAvis & PmRcn, at 306-09.
46. For a statutory example of this distinction, see 42 U.S.C. § 7607(dX6XC) (2000)
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vate parties will have more valuable things to say about such empirical in-

formation, and less to say about OMB's policy arguments.
Beyond its functional appropriateness, this distinction improves doctrinal clarity. First, it plays a large role in process at large, i.e., constitu4 Intional due process, both in its development 47 and recent exposition.
deed, understanding due process more broadly, it could be argued that a
"due process" right to participate in the setting of regulatory policy is guarameed by the right to participate in the electoral process, which ultimately
concerns the wisdom of alternative government policies. Second, this distinction tracks the basic contrast between the political and the technocratic
conceptions of the administrative process, allowing presidential influence
when policy matters are the subject, but limiting it when the issue is the
weight to be accorded empirical data in the application of a regulatory
principle to particular facts. Finally (and relatedly to the preceding points),
this distinction historically has helped inform the separation of powers
analysis concerning the scope of executive authority, in particular, when a
president has the constitutional authority to dismiss agency officials .49 Just
as courts have held that Article II does not give the president the power to
fire a member of the bureaucracy in order to influence the outcome of a
particular adjudication, so too it seems reasonable (if not quite as unassailable) to limit the president's power to inordinately influence how an agency
interprets particular empirical facts.5
(requiring EPA rules promulgated under the Clean Air Act "not be based ...on any information or data which has not been placed in the [rulemaking) docket") (emphasis added).
47. This distinction is traceable to two foundational due process decisions from the
early twentieth century, Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) and Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Boardof Equalization,239 U.S. 441 (1915). See also 2 DAvis & PmRcE,
supra note 26, at 7-8 (explaining the pragmatic distinction, based on the value of the privately-held information, between requiring government to provide a hearing when the issue
pertains to matters of historical, or "adjudicative" fact, and not requiring a hearing when the
issue pertains to legislative, or "policy" facts).
48. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (announcing a three-part test to determine what procedures are required by due process, including a factor asking how much
more accurate the result would be if the requested procedure was provided).
49. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (stating Congress
has power to insulate from presidential removal-at-will status agency heads exercising
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial powers); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926)
(stating such authority does not extend to dismissals intended to influence results of agency
adjudications in the midst of an opinion strongly supportive of the president's Article 11based authority to dismiss agency personnel). Elsewhere, I argue that one of the most important characteristics of adjudication (as opposed to legislation/rulemaking) is the former's
reliance on the litigants' particular facts. See Araiza, supranote 24, at 391-96.
50. This statement might not be quite as unassailable because our concepts of due process, and thus the Myers-based limit on presidential influence, tum heavily on the need for
impartiality when government singles out an individual. The APA recognizes this, for ex-
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But even given the abstract logic of a more stringent attitude toward disclosure of OMB fact communications, such an interpretation of the APA
might still allow significant amounts of such information to remain secret.
First, the line between fact and policy arguments is not distinct. Recall, for
example, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) argument in State Farm that the relatively high use of automatic seat belts in
test cars suggested a broader program would fail.5 ' The agency concluded
the purchasers of the specially-equipped test cars could be expected to be
especially committed to seat belt use, and their less-than-unanimous use of
the device suggested the general public would reject it. Surely that interpretation of the usage data was influenced by the Reagan administration's
overall anti-command-and-control and pro-market forces philosophy.
Would such an argument have to be disclosed for testing in the notice-andcomment process? Would it yield a better empirical understanding of the
world, which would lead to better regulation?
The uniqueness of OMB review complicates the analysis, even assuming
a clearly empirical fact-based communication. In real life the weight the
agency accorded such factual information would not rest solely with the information's intrinsic value, but also partially with the fact that OMB "sponsored" it before the agency.52 Indeed, much of OMB's value as an information conduit presumably arises from the possibility that OMB might
adopt the information and use its influence to press it upon the agency. 53
Thus, it might be very difficult for a reviewing court to know how imporample, when it limits its most stringent decisional independence requirements to formal adjudications, rather than to formal agency action in general. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2000).
Often such singling out implies the defendant has very useful information, since the government decision presumably turns in large part on the defendant's own conduct, about
which the defendant can be expected to have good information. See, e.g., Bi-Metallic, 239
U.S. at 445-46; see also 2 DAvis & PIERCE, supranote 26, at 7-8 (discussing idea of right to
be heard and adjudicative versus legislative facts). The same question-how useful is the
information private parties typically hold?-yields a similar answer when the issue is one of
empirical, rather than policy, fact, even if the empirical dispute arises in a rulemaking.
However, because rulemakings do not raise the same basic concern about singling-out, there
may be slightly less call for limiting presidential influence in that situation.
51. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 5254 (1983) (analyzing argument that passive belts will not yield substantial increases in seatbelt usage).
52. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, PresidentialManagement of Agency Rulemaking, 57
Gao. WAsH. L. Rrv. 533, 579 (1989) ("]ue to their endorsement by OMB, [communications forwarded from private parties to agencies via OMB] may assume special prominence
in the agency's analysis, risking unfairness to those interested persons who do not enjoy the
same access.").
53. For an early example of this dynamic, see Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift ofPower:
Office of Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental ProtectionAgency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. . NAT. REsouRcEs L. 1, 61 n.308 (1984).
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tant a piece of information really was to an agency simply by examining
the information in the abstract. Moreover, if the agency accorded significant weight to the information because OMB had sponsored it, rather than
because of its intrinsic persuasiveness, it would not increase decisional accuracy to require its disclosure to the public. 4
Thus, it is possible that the functional concern for accurate decisionmaking-the concern that led to the distinction between factual and policy
communications in the first place-would not always be served by requiring disclosure of factual information. When an agency values a piece of
information in part because of its sponsorship by OMB, a disclosure requirement would confuse the technocratic/scientific vision of agency action-under which disclosure of data would allow private parties to critique
it, thus creating a better understanding of the problem-with the vision in
which agency action is ultimately political action, responsive to the politically accountable White House. Under this latter vision the real importance of the data lies in the fact that it came from political higher-ups
whose power the agency decision-maker has to respect as a practical matter. Of course, a court could attempt to recreate the actual decision making
climate within the agency, to determine the degree to which OMB's sponsorship of the information made that information important to the agency. 5
But, that task seems quite difficult, and arguably inappropriate given
courts' hesitancy to inquire into the mind of the decision-maker.56
III. LEGISLATIVE ACTION IN RESPONSE TO OMB INFLUENCE
The above analysis assumes legislative inaction, which forces litigants to
argue that existing law limits OMB involvement in rulemaking. Subject to
constitutional constraints, Congress could, of course, legislate explicit controls over OMB. The controversy concerning the secrecy and private influence over the Bush administration's early energy policy discussions, while
not precisely analogous, raises the possibility that this issue could become
politically prominent.5 7 The possibility increases given the combination of
54. It should also be noted that this problem is not addressed by the Clinton order's
requirement that all privately-generated information sent to OMB be forwarded to the
agency. Indeed, the problem is that, as OMB forwards the information, it exerts pressure on
the agency to accord it more weight than the agency might otherwise.
55. In at least one case, New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147, 1152 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1992),

the court refused to consider challenges to objections President Bush's Council on Competitiveness made to proposed EPA regulations, finding, without further explanation, that
none of the objections were "a decisive factor" in EPA's final decision.
56. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (concluding that, just as
examination of a judge would be destructive, so too is examination of a decision-maker).
57. On February 22, 2002, the Comptroller General of the United States sued Vice
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a Republican administration and at least a partially Democratic Congress,
the same combination that led to serious clashes over OMB's role during
the 1980s.
In response to a concern about OMB influence, Congress could simply
limit OMB's role in regulatory review across the board, or with regard to a
particular regulatory program.
Such legislation would not have to be
phrased as restrictions on OMB per se, but merely as requirements on the
agency that all information of a certain type be docketed on the public record. Such requirements could potentially raise constitutional issues to the
extent they precluded confidential meetings between the White House and
the agencies at which policy issues were discussed,59 just as such a requirement might be problematic if it was found by a court interpreting the
APA. 60 Such a statute might be constitutionally troubling to the extent it
was viewed as intentional congressional interference in White House policy
coordination to increase Congress's power in the tug-of-war over agency
policy. Even Morrisonv. Olson's formula, which generously allowed legislative power to intrude on the performance of executive functions, noted
the problem raised by one branch's attempt to aggrandize itself at the expense of another.6 On the other hand, as discussed earlier, there is less
President Dick Cheney over the latter's refusal to turn over records relating to the Bush
Administration's National Energy Policy Development Group. See Walker v. Cheney, Civ.
Act. No. 1:02cv00340 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 22, 2002). This suit is nearly unprecedented and
has attracted a great deal of political notoriety, in large part because of the collapse of Enron
Corporation, which is thought to have participated in the group's deliberations.
58. Of course, such limits need not take the form of a formal statute. In the mid1980's, for example, congressional pressure led OMB to adopt ex parte contact procedures
that were later adopted, as modified, in the Clinton executive order. See Hearings, infra
note 74.
59. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 404-08 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
60. It is possible that a clear congressional command to that effect might be considered
on firmer constitutional ground, if it represented an explicit statement by Congress, especially if the command came in the same statute granting the agency the authority to regulate
in a particular area. The Court's separation of powers jurisprudence generally examines the
factual context of the action alleged to have encroached on another branch's prerogatives.
In our situation, the fact that a limitation on 0MB influence was enacted as part of a statute
granting an agency significant regulatory power might influence a court's holding on constitutionality, when compared, for example, with a similar requirement emanating from a
congressional attempt to limit OMB across the board. See, e.g., CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833 (1986) (setting forth factors to decide the legality of Article I courts, including limited
nature of encroachment on traditional objects of Article III court concern). It is also unlikely that a court would impose such a requirement on OMB as part of section 553, since
that interpretation would be in no way compelled by the language of that statute, and would
create a significant constitutional issue for the court to decide.
61. See 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988); see also Bowsher v, Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727
(1986) (discussing the dangers of congressional usurpation of power from a coordinate
branch).
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reason to be concerned if the legislation only pertained to non-policy communications, such as analyses of empirical data. To the extent such nonpolicy communications reflect the technocratic side of the agency's personality, statutory limits on secret executive communications would not seem
to unduly restrict the president's ability to set his law-enforcement
agenda.62
An interesting question would arise if Congress took a more subtle route,
and prescribed a formal rulemaking process for a given regulatory program.
In that case, the APA would prohibit such contacts,63 but what would be the
result if the president argued Article H required he be allowed such contacts to set his administration's regulatory policy? Ideally, formal rulemakings should be viewed as reserved for situations where the character of
the issue is quasi-adjudicative, such that the due process analysis and the
Article 11 issue both cut against presidential power.64 For example, in
United States v. FloridaEast Coast Railway,63 the Court strained to find an
authorizing statute to not require formal rulemaking. The majority focused
in part on the due process implications of the distinction between rulemaking and adjudication. 66 The Court determined the issue-rates set by the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) for rented railroad boxcars-was
closer to a legislative-type issue for which informal rulemaking procedures
were appropriate.67 But, there is no reason to assume that Congress could
not require formal rulemakings for a topic that is not quasi-adjudicative.
Indeed, if Congress was looking for a way to limit OMB's influence with-

62. Cf Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691 (focusing on whether statutory restrictions on the
President's removal power "impede [his] ability to perform his constitutional duty").
63. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (2000).
64. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) (observing, as an exception to
its otherwise strong endorsement of presidential control over agency personnel, that the
President would not have the authority to exercise that control in order to influence a particular adjudication).
65. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
66. See id. at 244-46. Justice Douglas' dissent also focused on this issue, reaching the
opposite conclusion-namely, that the type of proceeding involved historically had been
viewed as quasi-adjudicatory. See id. at 256 (discussing fact that administrative agencies
must promulgate rules by "taking and weighing... evidence," and make agency decisions
which are supported by such evidence).
67. See id. at 245-46. Tellingly, the Court's reluctance in Florida East Coast to read a
statute as requiring formal rulemaking has not transferred to adjudication, where courts have
been more willing to require formal procedures. See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564
F.2d 1253, 1262 n.30 (9th Cir. 1977); see generally SEPHENi BREYER FT AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASEs 584 (4th ed.
1999). This fact suggests the Court in FloridaEast Coast was, at the very least, reading
Congress's procedural mandates against a backdrop of the different applicability of due process guarantees for rulemaking and adjudication.
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out explicitly saying so (and thus possibly provoking a political collision),
it might decide to do so by requiring a formal rulemaking process, which
would trigger the APA's prohibition on this type of ex parte contact.
Because formal rulemaking has fallen into disrepute, courts have not had
occasion to consider this issue. Such a case would squarely present the
question of the scope of Article II's requirement that the president be able
to consult confidentially with his agents on matters of general regulatory
policy, as against Congress's determination that a particular issue was best
dealt with through a formalized, quasi-judicial process. In the past, courts
rejecting claims of unfair ex parte contacts with agency decision makers
have given weight to congressional directions that the agency consult with
outside parties. 8 Conversely, other courts have accorded weight to a congressional mandate that certain decisions be quasi-adjudicative, even
though that determination had the effect of limiting executive influence
over the agency's decision.6 9 To the extent that these courts give significant weight to these congressional categorizations, they necessarily imply
that Congress has a role in the constitutional decision of how much authority Article II gives the president to influence the agency confidentially. 70
Regardless of the outcome of the constitutional dispute, the key point is
that Congress's tool is procedural. Attempting to control ex parte communications by means of prescribing a standard of review, or by requiring that
an agency's decision be based on a particular record, would most likely not
end such contacts, especially when the subject matter is on the frontier of
scientific knowledge, where the evidence can reasonably support widely
different conclusions and where courts defer to the agency's technical expertise in interpreting the data. Indeed, the only situation in which such a
record-evidence rule would make a difference would be one, governed by
the substantial evidence standard, in which the secret, off-the-public-record

68. See, e.g., Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Babbitt, 929 F. Supp. 1165, 1176-77 (W.D.
Wis. 1996) (rejecting tribe's request for discovery beyond agency record into agency deci-

sion, based in part on fact that Congress had directed agency to consult with state and local
officials before acting, thus rendering decision not quasi-adjudicative and subject to more
restrictive ex parte contact rules).
69. See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comn., 984 F.2d 1534,
1541 (9th Cir. 1993).

70. Another example of the weight accorded congressional determinations was provided in FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948). In that case, the Court rejected a
due process claim of bias and prejudgment based on the fact that the commissioners of the
FTC had investigated industry conditions and found a certain practice to probably constitute
a legal violation, and then had prosecuted a company in that industry for violating the law
for engaging in that practice. The Court rejected the firm's due process claim in part because it would have meant the frustration of Congress's will in structuring the agency to
give it both general investigatory and prosecutorial powers. See id. at 701-02.
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information was crucial to the supportabilityof the decision, as opposed to
the agency's actual decision of which record-supportable option to choose.
But, in that case, there would most likely be a violation of the APA's rulemaking procedures. The situation, by hypothesis, would be one in which
the non-disclosed information was crucial to the decision's rationality.
Thus, courts would likely find the information so crucial as to require
agency disclosure and testing through the rulemaking process. 7' Thus, in
this case-the only one where OMB influence might cause a court to strike
down a regulation as violating the APA's substantive review requirements-the substantive review standard does not carry any weight independent of procedural requirements.
However, process review may also be incapable of fully guarding
against inappropriate OMB involvement. Constitutional due process does
not apply to rulemaking. The APA's informal rulemaking procedures may
not stretch to include significant limits on OMB interference, and Vermont
Yankeen counsels against courts requiring more procedure without congressional mandate. Finally, such mandates might encounter an Article II
obstacle, especially to the extent OMB involvement consists of policybased "jawboning." Indeed, as noted earlier in the discussion of NHTSA's
seat belt argument, 73 it might even be difficult to tell when a policy argument stopped and an empirical, or "objective," analysis began.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, limits on judicial policing of the rulemaking process may
make limitations on OMB interference analogous to an underenforced constitutional norm, which the offending branch itself is primarily responsible
for guarding. Just as legislatures bear primary responsibility for ensuring
that the lawmaking process is marked by deliberation and at least some attention to the public good, so too the executive may bear ultimate responsibility for ensuring the procedural integrity of the administrative rulemaking
process. The fact that presidents, since at least Carter, have taken steps to
disclose White House communications with agencies 74 suggests it is not
71. Moreover, since the issue in substantive review is the technocratic rationality of the
decision, a situation in which 0MB-supplied information was crucial would be one in which

that information was of a factual nature, thus making it more appropriate from a functional
point of view for the court to use rulemaking procedural requirements as the basis for striking down the iegulation.
72. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519 (1978).
73. See supranote 51 and accompanying text.
74. Of course, at least with regard to the Reagan and Bush administrations, these steps
were taken only after Congress had applied political pressure. See President'sManagement
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unrealistic to expect future presidents to do the same, and thus, to ensure
what courts by themselves may not be able to guarantee: an open and fundamentally fair rulemaking process.

Legislative Initiatives: Hearing on S.J Res. 190, S. 1206, S. 1657, S. 2004-S. 2010, H.R.
2401 Before the Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-58, 97
(1986).

